Report on Cynthia Woods

[tsmwebb]

... if it is as common as you indicate to bolt small footprint, concentrated loads, to the hull panels with no tie in to the internal stiffening structure, then designers and builders are doing something that neither I nor any steel boat designer I've ever considered competent would dream of doing. ...

Well there is supposed to be a tie-in -- the flanges on the floors tie them to the panel. The floors are there primarily to take the keel loads.

Strut and bulb construction is a persistent theme in yacht design. Herreshoff made a couple (of course) and Lapworth's Cal 20 is ubiquitous. This is not a novel problem. Struts are attached directly to the canoe body without a stub and many "traditional" fin keels are too. The classic way to attach the strut is to put a flange on it. Keel flanges make the whole design easier but are not possible with stubs. They are expensive to fabricate and install and are not required to get adequate strength. Another expensive but strong way to attach struts is to machine the top into a rectangular prism and put it into a box in the hull that is then tied into the floors. If price were no object you could introduce an energy absorber into the box. I've added a sketch. It is easy enough to imagine a system where there is a visual indicator if the keel bolts have been forced up into the box and a hull inspection is needed. There are other advantages to such a system. But, the engineering of the crush zone would be a bugger and the cost of the system would be prohibitive...

--Tom.

 

[Roger Long]

However, I still feel that Richards is right to say that absent the grounding and negligent inspection and repair work there is no reason to believe the keel would have failed when it did.

That's one of those true but misleading statements. I am 100% certain myself that, absent the grounding damage and lack of restoration to original strength, the keel would not have failed WHEN it did. However, this position could still be entirely consistent with Dobroth's assertion that failure at some point was nearly inevitable, even without grounding stress or damage, and that the design presented unacceptable risk from the time of launch.

This is a common kind of defense. I was the British government's stability expert in the highly political inquiry into the capsizing and loss of a sail training vessel. I proved, and it was accepted as a finding of the inquiry, that the vessel could be capsized by only a 22% increase in wind speed when sailing at a normal heel angle. Since wind gusts are often 50% over nominal wind velocity, this was a truly appalling finding. The counter claim was that there was no way to prove that the squall which hit the vessel was not of a magnitude that would have capsized a vessel of normal stability and that the stability deficiency could not therefore be proven directly casual to the loss!

There are many weaknesses and failures that can be excused in racing boats as a necessity of the competitive service. This keel attachment is not one of them. Let’s say you add 250 pounds to the laminate and floor structure above the keel root. Properly done, it certainly could have produced a keel and hull that would have survived that grounding history without damage or weakening and certainly would not have fallen off that night. But, wow, 250 pounds is a lot to add to a competitive racing boat. Well, take 250 pounds out of the top of the lead keel. The effect would be to raise 250 pounds about a foot from the top of the keel to the hull floor structure, 250 foot pounds of vertical moment. 250 / 15,700 (the vessel’s sailing displacement) = center of gravity rise = .016 feet = .19 inches. If GM was 3 feet, this would be a .53% decrease in sail carrying power. (That’s less than one percent.) Overall vessel weight would be identical. In practice though, it wouldn’t have taken 250 pounds to dramatically increased the strength of this connection.

 

[tsmwebb]

That's one of those true but misleading statements. I am 100% certain myself that, absent the grounding damage and lack of restoration to original strength, the keel would not have failed WHEN it did. However, this position could still be entirely consistent with Dobroth's assertion that failure at some point was nearly inevitable, even without grounding stress or damage, and that the design presented unacceptable risk from the time of launch. ...

I didn't mean to be misleading. I think we agree that the grounding and failure to repair the boat was the proximate cause of the boat's loss and the death of a man. The core of Dobroth's finding is that the grounding and repair played no part in the loss. I don't see how these positions can be reconciled.

As I said before, Dobroth's conclusions about the weakness of the design and/or yacht as built may be valid. However, given his obvious bias and gross misrepresentation of the role that the grounding must have payed, I can't bring myself to take any of his other assertions at face value. I have to assume he's lying about them as well. The only other informed opinion we have is Richards' and he concludes that the design was adequate.

--Tom.

 

[Roger Long]

I didn't mean to be misleading.

Sorry, I wasn't implying that you were being missleading but referring to the Richards position.

I've since had a chance to go through the two reports again as well as taking a look at the ABS standards that A&M reproduced. I think Debroth entirely deals with the grounding issue (at least from the design standpoint) since the ABS rules (which have risen in my opinion having now looked at them) clearly require structure to deal with forseeable and non-catastrophic. i.e. not going ashore in pounding surf, grounding strains and the vessel clearly lacked this structure. The hull should have survived those events without turning into a death trap.

Richards OTOH really seems to be reaching to defend an indefensible design and the quality of the analysis and supporting data seems a lot less pursuasive to one who has looked at a lot of this kind of thing over the years. I see a lot more bias in this report which I admit is odd since it was prepared for an obstensibly disinterested party.

 

[tsmwebb]

...I've since had a chance to go through the two reports again as well as taking a look at the ABS standards that A&M reproduced. I think Debroth entirely deals with the grounding issue (at least from the design standpoint) since the ABS rules (which have risen in my opinion having now looked at them) clearly require structure to deal with forseeable and non-catastrophic. i.e. not going ashore in pounding surf, grounding strains and the vessel clearly lacked this structure. The hull should have survived those events without turning into a death trap..

Okay, I guess we have to agree to disagree. If the boat had gone aground and Texas A&M had hired a surveyor and he had condemned the boat as unfixable because of design failings then I could agree with you. That's not what happened. As I read the testimony not a single qualified person was involved in the inspection or the repair of the boat. The grounding was a major event. They were towed off. Debroth passes it off by saying, essentially, "hey my boats go aground and some of them hard but they haven't had this kind of failure." I doubt he would sit in a witness stand and say "if one of my boats was hauled an had this kind of damage showing I wouldn't advise getting it inspected." He also doesn't say "when my boats go aground so hard they have to be towed off I expect them to be essentially unharmed." I think he's not being candid. He just assumes there was no laminate damage. That's hard to square with his assertion that the deeper keel and thinner panel layup on this boat made it more prone to grounding damage than a typical boat. I don't see how he can argue it both ways. The pictures he enters into evidence show substantial damage to the keel and hull both fore and aft. Those kinds of groundings can and do result in total losses of boats. The pictures show the keel broken away from the hull and the hull crushed. That's all they should have had to see to know that they needed serious expert advise. The pictures of the repair show WR on top of paint. He doesn't tell us how that can be a quality repair.
That boat should never have left the repair yard in that condition. There are design issues and construction mistakes, but fact that a school would allow its staff and students to hack together a repair on the most critical area of a boat that they intended to send their kids to sea in is unforgivable to me.

--Tom.

 

[Roger Long]

Okay, I guess we have to agree to disagree.

Again, I'm focusing and commenting primarily on what the reports say about the keel design. As for A&M's actions, I would agree that they are culpable for not doing what they probably wouldn't have had to do if the vessel had been fully in compliance with the ABS rules and properly engineered.

 

[Texas Lake Sailor]

Poorly supervised program

Like most engineering failures there are surely multiple contributing causes, which if anyone had been foreseen and accounted for the failure could have been avoided. However there are some very troubling issues that can't be overlooked. The boat had suffered not one but several groundings in the past. And never had a professional survey done either before or after repairs where completed. The boat was in in a slip where at low tide it rested on its keel, this was not even none until the CG investigation. The sailing center manager was not a professional or lic professional and in fact had been the skipper of the boat on at least one of the previous groundings. Proper supervision and records of repairs and incidents were not kept. All of this leads one to say if not this event, then surely another was going to happen. If you are going to maintain a fleet of boats that have multiple users and young kids at that then you'd better have somebody in charge that knows what they are doing. It surely will reduce the risk of failure.

 

[tsmwebb]

Not really directly related but sorta rimes: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZdVHhg5600Y&feature=rec-HM-fresh+div

--Tom.

 

[dvideohd]

What is the end result?

My son went to Texas A&M, Galveston during this time. He sailed on the TAMUG team for a while - and knew all the people that were on this boat.

What I wonder - is how the findings will affect other schools and organizations... if the results from findings are no more than fodder for lawyers to argue (and be paid) over, then nothing can really change or get fixed... So does this situation happen again?

Are the resulting findings of any value to say or use for other organizations to change procedures about how their boats are maintained? Any rules or recommended procedures to be changed?

I guess I also think my "old" boat... it's 40 years old and has seven bolts to hold the Keel on. Next time it is out on the hard - getting maintainence - how can an inspection be done to make sure the Keel is sound and the mounting is secure? If there aren't good answers for my boat, then how can anyone check to reduce the possibly of such a tragic situation in the future?

--jerry

 

[Peter Ross]

Okay, I guess we have to agree to disagree. If the boat had gone aground and Texas A&M had hired a surveyor and he had condemned the boat as unfixable because of design failings then I could agree with you. That's not what happened. As I read the testimony not a single qualified person was involved in the inspection or the repair of the boat. The grounding was a major event. They were towed off. Debroth passes it off by saying, essentially, "hey my boats go aground and some of them hard but they haven't had this kind of failure." I doubt he would sit in a witness stand and say "if one of my boats was hauled an had this kind of damage showing I wouldn't advise getting it inspected." He also doesn't say "when my boats go aground so hard they have to be towed off I expect them to be essentially unharmed." I think he's not being candid. He just assumes there was no laminate damage. That's hard to square with his assertion that the deeper keel and thinner panel layup on this boat made it more prone to grounding damage than a typical boat. I don't see how he can argue it both ways. The pictures he enters into evidence show substantial damage to the keel and hull both fore and aft. Those kinds of groundings can and do result in total losses of boats. The pictures show the keel broken away from the hull and the hull crushed. That's all they should have had to see to know that they needed serious expert advise. The pictures of the repair show WR on top of paint. He doesn't tell us how that can be a quality repair.
That boat should never have left the repair yard in that condition. There are design issues and construction mistakes, but fact that a school would allow its staff and students to hack together a repair on the most critical area of a boat that they intended to send their kids to sea in is unforgivable to me.

--Tom.

There are a few issues here that need to be clarified.

First, the Cynthia Woods is not a high performance ultra light racing boat. It is, at best, a high performance cruiser. Given the class of boats it raced against, the race committee's would agree. The prototype, a boat the company referred to as a shoal draft cruiser, actually had a faster PHRF #. Why? A similar boat in construction to hull#1 has won Key West Race Week and done well elsewhere. Although the boat sails against Hunters, O'Days and low end Beneteaus as well with a gifted slow rating. Again, why? Now I am not knocking the boats mentioned, they are not performance racers, as the CF38 is not.
The target boats were J105's and J109's with the "shoal draft", which is a term I never heard used describing my boat. Funny how the Ultra light race version suddenly needs to race against the boats mentioned. Please don't get all worked up because I mentioned those boats, they just are not performance boats. It's like racing a Greyhound against a Yorkie.................
I know this because I owned the rights to the boat, just hated the end result they had me create. So I sold a turn key operation to the guy to begin building "parts" which assembled, resembled a sailboat. They were unable to modify their own molds to create stadium seating and a user friendly cockpit. Why? Because they are not able to, simple and true.

The hull thickness: USCG reps measured the shim and hull, faking a greater hull thickness, which is far less, 1/2". Now that keel was changed for one simple reason. To aloow multiple depth options using one cord. Mars Keels charged at the time roughly $200/year/keel plug. Mitchell refused to pay the multiple storage fees and instructed Marek to design a onw size fits all keel.
YES, a solid lead keel is SIGNIFICANTLY different than the standard steel strut/lead bulb modern keels. Not only was that keel a huge chunk of lead, it is a low performing section, ultra NONrace configuration. I build high aspect carbon keels and rudders, I am an expert.
The keel bolt pattern had to be changed because they made the cord too thin for a proper bolt pattern. The pattern has not been mentioned, but an inline pattern of over sized bolts is weak. The 3" hull thickness described earlier in this topic is based on the bolt size and standards with regards to the relationship of hull thickness to bold size. Given the exteme size of the bolts, that hull would need to be 3" thick. Easy and end of that........

Laminate.
The boat was not bagged. It is also a combination of vinylester resins, to allow gelcoat and epoxy. The laminate also has incorrect fiber orientation, a mix of kevlar, that did nothing but add bulk, bulk that did not extend the laminates performance, yet decreased it. Hull thickness as measured by the USCG expert included materials not related to structure, yet implies such.
It's not rocket science, add more materials to the structure, tie those floors to the bolts. Install proper backing plates that won't saw the laminate to failure.

It's also insulting to continue calling that boat an ultra light, the actual weight was in fact much heavier than advertised, most likely because the boat was wet out using a chopper gun.

Looking at the photos, it also appears the boat has very little epoxy resin. A good thing if true because mixing resins of differing thermal expansion rates is stupid.

I know it's impossible to change someones hellbent intention to blindly follow the USCG and for some reason think a company that built less than one boat a year in it's short time is useless. However, the USCG is wrong here, dead wrong. CFYW sent that expert just what they wanted in the report. I have the original drawings, the USCG expert never asked for them to compare the alterations. I was more than happy to present those documents to the TAMU expert, who actually came to my shop for an interview. Never even recieved a call from Kiko, although I sure did give him an earful. Poor guy, he should have done his job!

Agout that stellar production company. Mitchell was quoted saying I was a one off advanced compsites expert who did not understand production building. Well, I build the production molds, built hull #1. Since then they built 6 boats, three "regatta" versions. One of those was built to original hull laminate, other two were the altered laminate boats donated to a school they knew would be extremely rough on the boats. One boat was a shaol draft boat, it was their first boat out of the mold. The boat was a heavy heavey boat, with transom an 1" under water.........yikes. That boat was dumped in my lap in Newport before a boatshow in 02. After making the boat show ready I travelled to the shop to see what they were doing wrong. I was Son Of Boomer with it's slab hunk of lead and went completely berzerk, melting down before their eyes. They had latered the keel boss and the keel sat on that UGLY shim.
The rest is internet history. I wrote about the boat on boatdesign, with many photos.
Tamu is destroying CW and sending GP back to the builder. THAT is the most amazing mistaek to date. Give the bad guys the only remaining evidence. Take GP out in big weather and sail it to see if the keel falls off. I'll do it in a heartbeat, with a rescue boat close at hand........... and just me, Marek and Mitchell. Come to think of it, no rescue boat.
Son of Boomer was destroyed in a hurricane last year. Same ugly laminate shards in those photos.
So, here's a "production" company touting their (well Mitchell's clain, remeber he had not seen wet resin before I built his boat........made it look too easy I think) production expertise (OH btw, they skipped hull #'s to imply greater #'s.....who does that?) and they lose 3 of their 7 in total boats. ONE I built, so it can be said they lost have their production line to failure and returned product. Not such a success story is it? I would love to hear the spin/twist on the facts.

Back to grinding carbon.

Yesterday I raced with my 86 year old father in the Mystic River Mudhead Hospice race. We won the event in our 40 year old Ohlson 38. I couldn't help think how lucky I am to be able to spend such a wonderful time woth my father............think of the Stones please.

Always question authority, PARTICULARLY the USCG who had to go outside their own entity to find an expert!

 

[tsmwebb]

...
Always question authority, PARTICULARLY the USCG who had to go outside their own entity to find an expert!

What can I say? I read the two reports and that's all I know about the incident. It is obvious from the pictures that the boat was a nasty piece of work. I too have built high performance foils and the foil and bulb are hideous. I've remarked on it before. But I still can't fathom how Texas A&M could pull the boat, look at the obviously serious damage to the keel and hull and think that it was ok to do the work themselves without supervision and then send it offshore full of students without anyone inspecting the repairs. Given that, I find it very, very hard to accept a report that completely exonerates the University for their negligence. I suppose, since you're admonishing us to question authority, I should ask: are you going to be a plaintiff's witness in the case against the builder or a defense witness for Texas A&M?

--Tom.

 

[PeterRoss]

What can I say? I read the two reports and that's all I know about the incident. It is obvious from the pictures that the boat was a nasty piece of work. I too have built high performance foils and the foil and bulb are hideous. I've remarked on it before. But I still can't fathom how Texas A&M could pull the boat, look at the obviously serious damage to the keel and hull and think that it was ok to do the work themselves without supervision and then send it offshore full of students without anyone inspecting the repairs. Given that, I find it very, very hard to accept a report that completely exonerates the University for their negligence. I suppose, since you're admonishing us to question authority, I should ask: are you going to be a plaintiff's witness in the case against the builder or a defense witness for Texas A&M?

--Tom.

No I am not planning to be a witness. I'm not exonerating TAMU. I am saying this, the student repairs had nothing to do with the laminate failure. The hull was not damaged by the groundings. The extremely poor workmanship failed in the keel floors, which delaminated. The compressed trailing edge of the keel is normal compression and does not indicate extreme hull failure. It is most likely due to the extreme flexing that horrible shim allowed.
Mr Dobroth and I argued at length about that shim, he feels they are business as usual, I totally disagree with him. It is simply one of several issues which ultimately lead to the laminate failure. The mold has the original keel boss, they dam it during construction, removing the level surface, which is on a waterline (not THE waterline) requiring a shim or simlar to replace the flat mating surface. The shim was built too thick and was done after the keels had been poured, poured with bolts at the original heights. The forward bolts are too short for the nuts, even the photo of GP shows thread issues, hence the belief it will fail in the same conditions without the need for grounding excuses. This is where I actually think TAMU is in bed with CFYW and the Mitchell clan. They are giving the only remaining possible piece of evidence to the group to be destroyed, tragic at best.
Dobroth suggested melting the top of the keel to expose more thread and reduce mass.
Modern bulb and strut keels need to be attatched inside the boat in sockets attached to structure tied to the sheer. The loads of these modern keels are often transferred to the deck. This boat was simply not well suited for such loads. Hull #1 was all structure, including "furniture." Bunkfronts tied to the keel and the chain plates, all removed in the following boats to allow better comfort below. I simply don't car what someone does to an interior, provided the structure isn't compromised for a flower vase.
Beside the obvious, my only regret is my lost friendship with Bruce Marek, a man I supported and respected before they talked me into mass producing that thing. Mitchell is just a rich kid with a bloated ego and no sailing talent. It simply amazes me to what lengths a person will go to for said ego and barstool bragging rights.

In closing, you really have to give this a good rethink. You are assuming the boat was constructed by experienced builders, not remotely the case. Bruce had been locked out of the shop by the two different shop managers and he works directly for the CFYW owner?!
I have tried to see the other side of the story, but it is all fiction and turns my stomach each time I view the facts as I know them.

I'm sorry,

Peter

 

[tsmwebb]

...
In closing, you really have to give this a good rethink. You are assuming the boat was constructed by experienced builders, not remotely the case. Bruce had been locked out of the shop by the two different shop managers and he works directly for the CFYW owner?!
I have tried to see the other side of the story, but it is all fiction and turns my stomach each time I view the facts as I know them....

Okay. You provide a lot of new data. Thanks for taking the time to write it up. There is so much acrimony and so much exposure to liability that it is hard, maybe impossible, to reconcile the competing theories from the outside. The whole thing is so very sad.

--Tom.

 

[Ross]

In my experience there are four ways that failures are treated; these are roughly fixed, repaired, restored and improved. All of these depend upon the skill and experience of the workers and the supervisors. A fix will get you going again as in a jury rig, A repair will remove most of the failed system and replace it with new like material. A restoration will remove all signs of damage and prepare the area for rebuilding to the original design. An improvment will anaylise the failure and determine why it happened and correct any and all design flaws that can be identified.
I shall leave it to others to determine how this system failure was handled.

 

[TimCup]

Common sense reminds me of "Last Clear Chance"-

a legal principle that simply states the person with the last clear chance to avoid an accident has an obligation to do so ( if this knuckehead doesn't get out of my lane, I'll just hit him..).

"Again, I'm focusing and commenting primarily on what the reports say about the keel design".

Roger, while the design debate rages on, the fact remains that the school had a chance- an obligation!- to make sure the boat could be safely operated after a hard grounding that caused serious damage. If the boat was irrepairable after the grounding because of design flaws, there might be a cause of action. But, certainly, the designer shouldn't be held accountable after the fact when repairs were made by students, without professional survey assistance and oversight.....

just one man's opinion. But I'm right, dammit!


cup

 

[tommays]

The J80s keels are a time bomb at this point and the only reason they were NOT fatal was massive luck

Now the J80 with 1000+ built has offical word from Jboats that the hulls built in 1994 as a family rocketship wore OUT

 

[Roger Long]

just one man's opinion. But I'm right, dammit!

Surely that opinion isn't that the school's actions let the builder completely off the hook?

Google "Joint and several liability".

A strange feature of this thread and those in other venues on the topic is the idea that you have to choose between blaming the university and the builder. There were failures by both and lessons to be learned about both the design and the operation. I'm a designer so I'm mostly focused on the former but that's been interpreted as defence of A&M more than it should be.

In regard to the programatic issues though, there is an aspect of this that hasn't been aired.

Would it be appropriate for university sailing program to buy a low hull number boat from a start up production company and entrust so much to it?

Would having the boat donated change the standard of care in determining that the vessel was suitable for the intended use?

Would the owner of the builder being the son of a large contributor to the university in general as well as the donor of the boat create a conflict that could obstruct the due diligence that might be exercised if the university were buying a boat outright from the same company?

Lots went wrong here but a keel attachment could have been designed which would have withstood all the abuse the university threw at it and it would not have effected the vessel's performance by a measurable amount. That's what I keep coming back to. As we saw in one of Maine Sail's recent posts, there are a lot of sketchy keels out there.

 

[Ross]

Roger, The other factor that seems to be overlooked here is the fact the Texas A&M is an engineering school. They have the in house expertese to inspect a structure for design and strength and to supervise repairs. I have not been convinced that the engineering school was asked to get involved in any aspect of the CW program.

 

[tsmwebb]

Surely that opinion isn't that the school's actions let the builder completely off the hook?

Google "Joint and several liability".

Please, let's not get into that legal theory. It is a deep dark pit. Your point that the design and even more the builder as well as TAMU made mistakes is, I think, correct. But you don't need to apply "joint and several" to get there -- indeed doing so almost of necessity brings to majority of the blame and penalty on the richest party independently of rational apportionment.

A strange feature of this thread and those in other venues on the topic is the idea that you have to choose between blaming the university and the builder. There were failures by both and lessons to be learned about both the design and the operation. I'm a designer so I'm mostly focused on the former but that's been interpreted as defence of A&M more than it should be.

Not so strange (the legal system is essentially binary with winners and losers and not much in between). The terms of debate are largely set by the legal context. Except for the Coast Guard report the only evidence we have is from interested parties each of which knows it must win 100% or be liable for 100% of the damages. The stakes are high and we have to assume that they are doing everything in their power to win. The problem in this discussion is that the case is being litigated and the fog and mistrust in the evidence that results makes it very difficult to tell where the truth ends and the lawyering begins. But we aren't the legal system, and I agree that it is important to look at all the mistakes that either did take place or even might have taken place as we look for lessons.

In the context of SBO it might well be better to consider improvements in practice or guidance that might help with the design or might inform consumers of designs separately from the question of Justice. For example, we know that the keel had a very narrow root and inline bolts. We don't really have to determine if they caused or even contributed to this loss to discuss the kind of flags that should be raised in a perspective owner or operators mind by the sight of them. And, your question about donated boats is an interesting one.

...
Lots went wrong here but a keel attachment could have been designed which would have withstood all the abuse the university threw at it and it would not have effected the vessel's performance by a measurable amount. That's what I keep coming back to....

We part ways again. You assert that a boat designed and built to best (or at least good) practices would have withstood the abuse. The problem for me with the argument is that we don't really know much about exactly how much the boat was abused. They didn't get it inspected and we're left to speculate on how hard they crashed and even on how many occasions. I've seen a tugboat virtually destroyed by running aground. There are some groundings that even very strong designs will not survive. So, I get all argumentative when you and others assert that the boat didn't delaminate as a result of the grounding -- nobody checked we don't know and the one and only disinterested inspector believes it did. And, that some other boat would have survived the grounding unharmed -- we just don't know because we can only speculate on the particulars of the grounding. However, I totally agree that the design and build were very bad. Good boats would have had a better chance of surviving largely unharmed. And, designers, builders, buyers and operators can do a better job and be safer if we recognize bad work and insist on good.

--Tom.

 

[tommays]

When you read about ALL the groundings and the ONE were they CHOSE to drag the boat several hundred feet to deep water and the boat STILL got everybody home ALIVE but damaged enough to required the boat to be hauled and the keel removed it becomes had to blame anybody but the school

Its not like other cases were the keels have fallen off with NO owner abuse

I have never seen a case before were removing a keel was a minor matter